The US wants to “modernise” AGOA. South Africa should pay attention
Author: Wongani Msiska, XA Global Trade Advisors
On 29 April 2026, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) issued a formal request for comments on the “modernisation” of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa). At first glance, this may sound procedural. It is not.
The language coming from Washington suggests that Agoa is no longer being viewed primarily as a development instrument. It is increasingly being framed as a strategic trade tool designed to advance American commercial, industrial, and geopolitical interests. That shift matters for South Africa.
Agoa was temporarily extended by President Trump in February 2026, but only until 31 December 2026. The USTR is now effectively asking whether the current model still serves U.S. interests and, if not, what should replace it. The tone of the review is telling. The stated objective is to ensure Agoa “meets the needs of American workers and businesses”, advances U.S. “national security and economic security goals”, and creates a pathway toward more reciprocal trade arrangements. In other words, the debate is no longer simply about African access to the U.S. market. It is increasingly about what the United States gets in return.
Counting the cost of the relationship
One of the clearest themes running through the USTR documents is concern over trade imbalances. The U.S. goods trade deficit with South Africa reached $10.1 billion in 2025, up 13.9% from the previous year. U.S. imports from South Africa totalled $16.5 billion, while exports to South Africa stood at only $6.4 billion. From Washington’s perspective, this is becoming politically difficult to justify under a unilateral preference programme.
The USTR repeatedly questions whether Agoa has delivered meaningful commercial gains for the United States. The review notes that despite AGOA being in place since 2000, the U.S. share of Sub-Saharan African imports has steadily eroded while China, the European Union, and India expanded their positions. According to the USTR, the U.S. share of global agricultural exports to Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 15% to just 3% over the lifespan of Agoa. This matters because the current review is being driven by an “America First” trade framework. Under that lens, preference programmes are unlikely to survive indefinitely if they are perceived to benefit foreign exporters more than U.S. producers.
South Africa is already in the crosshairs
The USTR’s 2026 Foreign Trade Barriers Report dedicates substantial attention to South Africa. Some of the complaints are familiar. The United States argues that South Africa provides preferential treatment to the European Union and the United Kingdom through existing trade agreements, while U.S. exporters continue to face relatively high tariffs in sectors such as poultry, wine, and spirits. The poultry dispute remains particularly contentious. The USTR notes that U.S. poultry exports initially increased after the 2016 tariff-rate quota arrangement, but volumes have declined sharply since South Africa raised the normal import duties on bone-in chicken portions from 37% to 62%. During the 2024/2025 quota year, the United States reportedly utilised only 8% of the available quota.
Agricultural market access more broadly remains a major source of frustration for Washington. The USTR specifically highlights South Africa’s restrictions on U.S. pork products and what it describes as non-science-based sanitary and phytosanitary barriers. There are also concerns around intellectual property protection. The Copyright Amendment Bill and the Performers’ Protection Amendment Bill are explicitly identified as potential risks to the “adequacy and effectiveness” of copyright protection in South Africa. But the review goes further than traditional trade irritants.
The geopolitical dimension cannot be ignored
Perhaps the most important shift is geopolitical. The USTR repeatedly references “strategic competitors” and expresses concern that Agoa may indirectly benefit countries such as China. The review also places significant emphasis on critical minerals and supply chain security. This reflects a broader reality: trade policy is increasingly being used as an instrument of strategic competition. For South Africa, this creates a difficult balancing act. The country’s economic relationships with China, the EU, and other Brics partners are substantial and growing. At the same time, the United States remains an important export market, particularly for manufactured products such as vehicles.
The risk currently manifesting is that Agoa becomes less about trade preferences and more about strategic alignment.
We should be careful of what we wish for
There is a tendency in South Africa to assume that Agoa renewal is ultimately in America’s interest and will therefore continue in some form. This was always delusional. All of SA’s exports to the US, of which Agoa exports account for about a third, amount to around 0.3% of American imports. In fact all of Africa’s exports only take us to 0.5% of their imports. Agoa never was anything more than an American political tool. All that has changed is how obvious this now is.
The language coming from Washington suggests that “modernisation” could mean stricter enforcement, reciprocal obligations, narrower eligibility criteria, or even a gradual move away from non-reciprocal preferences altogether. South Africa should therefore approach this process with a degree of caution.
Agoa has provided important benefits to a small part of the South African economy for more than two decades, but we need to be careful to not overestimate these benefits. The total import duties saved by US importers is less than R2 billion in a year and the benefits are concentrated in a very small number of companies. The largest benefit flowed to automotive, steel and aluminium but that was before the 25% section 232 duties were imposed on these three categories.
Agoa is now the American Growth and Opportunities Act.
